Showing posts with label tavis ormandy responsible disclosure vulnerability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tavis ormandy responsible disclosure vulnerability. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 15, 2010

Was Tavis Ormandy's Disclosure Irresponsible?

Regarding Tavis Ormandy's recent disclosure of a vulnerability in Windows Help and Support Center, my understanding is that there are five basic paths to take when you have a valid vulnerability to disclose. They are enumerated below. In short, I think Tavis Ormandy went down the RFPv2 path, and thus was within his rights to disclose when he did assuming that Microsoft didn't in fact reply to him within the 5 days allowed.

As a corporate defender, I would prefer that researchers not take such an aggressive stance with disclosure, but my point is that what he did might have long-standing precedent.

1). CERT/CC - Public disclosure happens within 45 days of the vulnerability being reported to CERT/CC. CERT/CC notifies the vendor per their own process.

2). Full Disclosure Policy (Rain Forest Puppy policy version 2 - RFPv2) - Reporter of problem contacts the software vendor directly. The vendor is allowed 5 days to reply. If the vendor does reply within the 5 day time window, then a disclosure schedule should be agreed upon by both parties. After that, the vendor should provide updates every 5 days. The wording of the disclosure should be agreed upon by both parties. if the vendor does not reply back with 5 days of the initial contact, the reporter of the problem is free to disclose.

3). OIS (Organization for Internet Safety) - Finder submits a VSR (Vulnerability Summary Report). Vendor can choose to do a partial public disclosure at this point if they wish. The vendor must respond directly to the finder within 7 days. If the vendor doesn't respond in 7 days, then the finder must submit again, and the vendor gets another 3 days to reply. if the finder doesn't get a reply after this final 3 days, the finder is OK to publicly disclose.

4). Go through a vulnerability broker like Verisign iDefense VCP or TippingPoint ZDI and follow whatever policy that broker uses.

5). Sell directly to a private buyer. Many governments - including the U.S - purchase vulnerabilities for their own purposes.

Having served as an intermediary before, I can tell you that this process sometimes isn't a walk in the park. I am not saying anyone is right or wrong, but I am saying that what he did isn't new and maybe he is being singled out unfairly in the media.

UPDATE 13 July 2010 - Microsoft has released a fix for this vulnerability in July 2010 patch MS10-042.


References:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/2219475.mspx
UPDATED 13 July 2010 http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS10-042.mspx


email: david @ sharpesecurity.com
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